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Ethnicity  
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While lacking precise definition, the term ‘ethnicity’ commonly refers to collectivities 
that share a myth of origin.  Most who apply the term emphasise the importance of 
ancestry; others, the importance of history, most often migration (volkerwanderun) and 
settlement, but also of political passage, be it escape from oppression or the colonisation 
of new territory (Weber, 1968).  Common to many definitions is the sharing of a 
‘culture,’ the most notable aspect of which is language.  Indeed, many ethnic groups are 
known by the same name as that of the language they speak. 
 
The boundary between nationalism and ethnicity remains ill defined and the logic 
mobilised by the students of the one often parallels that invoked by students of the other.  
So often do they overlap that the distinction will not be tightly drawn in this essay.  To be 
noted is that limitations of space prevent even a selective review of the rich literature on 
ethnicity in the advanced industrial nations, especially that originating from the United 
States. 
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Sparking much of the research on ethnicity in developing areas is the tension between 
state building and ethnic self-assertion.  Also important is the tension between theoretic 
expectations and observable behaviour. 
 
 
The Power of Ethnicity 
While many factors account for the attention given to ethnicity, among the most 
important is the tension between ethnic groups and the state.  Limiting attention to the 
last century, while attempting to lay the foundations for peace following the First World 
War, diplomats sought to base political order on sovereign states, a task made difficult by 
the claims for sovereignty articulated by ethnic groups (MacMillan, 2001).  The tension 
between ethnicity and state building emerged again mid-century, when the collapse of 
colonial empires bequeathed a multitude of newly independent nations (see for example 
Emerson, 1960 and Apter, 1963).  The leaders of these nations faced political challenges 
from sub-national groupings: some religious, some linguistic, some regional – and many 
ethnic.  After World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States defended the 
integrity of states within their respective spheres of influence.  But the subsequent 
collapse of the Soviet Union limited the ability of the first and the incentives of the 
second to continue to do so.  The subsequent recrudescence of ethnic conflict in the 
Balkans and the collapse of states in Africa re-emphasised the magnitude of the tensions 
between ethnicity and state building. 
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The Limitations of Theory 
In analysing the behaviour of ethnic groups, scholars initially drew on the works of those 
who sought to describe and explain the rise of modern Europe.  One cluster drew on 
Marx and Engels; a second on Weber (1968), Durkheim (1933), and others (such as 
Tonnies, 1963).  The first focused on the rise of capitalism, emphasising industrial 
development and class struggle.  The second focused on modernisation, emphasising its 
impact on organisation and culture.  For both, the power of ethnicity appeared anomalous 
and therefore a problem demanding exploration.  Attempts to address this anomaly 
inspired much of the subsequent research. 
 
For Marxists, the power of ethnicity in capitalist societies was problematic because social 
organisation and political institutions are structured by the means of production: social 
classes, not ethnic groups, should dominate politics in the modern era.  For the second 
group of theorists, the contemporary power of ethnicity remained problematic because 
the forces of modernisation should erode its organisational and cultural foundations.  
Urbanisation should fragment primary ties, replacing them with interest-based 
relationships.  Literacy should enable people to transcend parochial affiliations.  And 
mass participation should strengthen the power of nationalism, leading to the break-up of 
colonial empires, perhaps, but also to the rise of nation-states. 
 
The continued power of ethnic groups provoked theoretical innovations in both schools 
of scholarship.  Among Marxists, many responded by focusing on the transition to 
capitalism rather than upon its consolidation.  In doing so, they joined their Leninist Page   Ethnicity_Paper  4 
colleagues in viewing the rise of capitalism as a global rather than national phenomenon.  
Major portions of the economies of the newly independent states contain ‘pre-capitalist’ 
modes of production in which labour retains control over the means of production; to a 
greater extent than in the centre, economies in the periphery remain rural and agrarian.  
The forces of capitalism – the market for commodities on the one hand and for factors of 
production (including capital) on the other – spread from the advanced industrial societies 
to the agrarian periphery.  The table is thereby set for the rise of ethnic groups in the 
developing nations. 
 
In one variant of this tableau, the forces of ethnicity represent sectoral interests, usually 
those of agriculture as it declines relative to the industrial core.  Thus Gellner’s (1983) 
justly famous discussion of Ruritania and Hechter’s (1986) study of clashes between the 
centre and periphery in the process of state formation.  In another variant, ethnicity 
represents a class interest (e.g. Breton, 1964; Sklar, 1967).  As development proceeds, a 
rising bourgeoisie seeks to consolidate its position. In markets for goods, it seeks to 
restrict competition from ‘foreigners;’ appealing to communal sentiments, it promotes 
trade protection.  In markets for labour, it champions ethnic quotas.  In markets for land, 
it champions the property rights of the ‘sons of the soil’ against the claims of ‘strangers.’  
The bourgeoisie thus appeals to communal sentiments in order to consolidate its position 
in the new economic order. This last variant has also been applied, of course, to ethnic 
relations in advanced industrial nations, particularly South Africa and the United States, 
where ethnic groups occupy different positions in the class system (Wright, 1977; 
Greenberg, 1980).  Page   Ethnicity_Paper  5 
Varieties of Explanation 
Among those who adhere to modernisation theory, some respond to its failure of 
prediction by re-affirming the power of ‘primordial’ identities (Geertz, 1963).  As the 
forces of modernisation spread, less educated, more rural, and more ‘traditional’ 
segments of society enter politics (Deutsch, 1961).  When the rate of social mobilisation 
exceeds the capacity of elites to control or to shape them, then primordial sentiments 
displace national identities in defining the collective interest in politics – thus reconciling 
the co-variation of modernisation and ethnicity. 
 
Others emphasise the role of elites rather than masses in accounting for the power of 
ethnicity. When competing for office, politicians mobilise political supporters.  Ethnic 
groups provide low cost means for rallying constituents; and by targeting distributive 
benefits to their members, politicians can build a loyal political base, thus assuring 
themselves of office (Bates, 1973; Brass, 1985).   This approach shares with Marxian 
interpretations an instrumentalist view of ethnicity: communal appeals are made to 
advance private interests.  It differs in that the goals are political rather than economic. 
 
Combining elements of both approaches is a third, often referred to as constructivism 
(e.g. see Anderson, 1991 and Hobsbaum and Ranger, 1983). In keeping with the 
primordialists, constructivists view ethnic identities as a cultural endowment; but in 
keeping with instrumentalists, they view ethnic identities as malleable.  Distinguishing 
their position is the belief that while identities can be reshaped, they can be altered only 
at significant cost.   Page   Ethnicity_Paper  6 
 
Primordialism seeks to explain the persistence of tradition: as in the writings of Kaplan 
(1994), primordialists often interpret contemporary conflicts as the renewal of age old 
antagonisms – ones that antedate the formation of a nation state.  Interpretivists and 
constructivists seek to explain change.  Because some ethnic groups are virtually the 
creations of those who compete for positions of advantage in the modern state, most 
scholars feel that the latter two advance the stronger argument (see Anderson et al., 
1967). 
Theoretical Convergence 
Mid-century scholars such as Mitchell (1956), Epstein (1958) and Gluckman (1960) 
noted that in some situations, such as in labour relations, appeals to class solidarity 
dominate appeals to ethnic identity; in others settings, such as during elections, appeals to 
ethnic interests dominate those to class solidarity.  These findings received subsequent 
confirmation in later studies by Melson (1971) and Melson and Wolpe (1970) (see also 
Anderson et al., 1967) and gave rise to the notion of ‘situational selection.’  They also 
provided a point of entry for rational choice theory to approach the study of cultural 
politics. 
 
The notion of ‘situational selection’ suggests that people organise their perceptions and 
choices depending on how an issue is framed.  Ethnic identities are not eroded (as the 
Marxists and modernisation theorists once thought), but rather retained; supplemented 
with new identities, such as that of a worker; and, in some settings, activated.  When class 
solidarity is valuable, ethnic differences are set aside; when competing for the spoils of Page   Ethnicity_Paper  7 
office, they are re-affirmed.  Viewed from this perspective, ethnicity can be seen as a 
choice or a strategy, the value of which varies with the situation.   
 
An important feature of the ‘situation’ is, of course, the behaviour of leaders who seek to 
mobilise collective action, be it in the form of a labour or ethnic movement.  As Posner 
(2004a) demonstrates, such leaders too appear to choose purposefully, assessing the 
relative advantages of ethnic mobilisation against other means of recruiting political 
support.   
 
To invoke an ethnic identity may be a choice, but, as emphasised by Dickson and Scheve 
(2004) the expected value of the choice depends upon the anticipated behaviour of others.  
Departing from Posner’s decision-theoretic reasoning, Dickson and Scheve (2004) build 
a game theoretic model in which political entrepreneurs choose the strength of ethnic 
appeals while anticipating the response of political rivals.  A notable implication of their 
model is that the relationship between policy preferences and electoral support would be 
discontinuous in democratic settings – something that seems to be validated by Ferree’s 
(2002) research into electoral behaviour in multi-ethnic South Africa.  Notable too is 
Dickson and Scheve’s use of Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) model of social preferences – 
a model that provides a flexible but tractable way of incorporating social identities into 
the decisions of individuals who are rational. 
 
While the early literature on situational selection invoked dominance, the more recent 
literature thus invokes contingency.  The value of a strategy depends on the expected Page   Ethnicity_Paper  8 
response of others.  In some circumstances, the assertion of a political identity may be 
dangerous, unless others also affirm it: dissent abides by this logic (Kuran, 1989).  In 
other situations, affirming an identity may become more profitable the fewer the numbers 
who affirm it: thus the logic of collaboration.  In such situations, no strategy is 
unambiguously best and multiple outcomes become possible. 
 
One implication is that small changes in behaviour can generate large consequences; 
choices can cascade, as persons, reacting to the decisions of others, recalculate the costs 
and benefits of affirming their identity.  Thus does Laitin (1998) explore variation in the 
identities chosen by Russians left stranded in non-Russian republics after the break up of 
the Soviet Union.  Another implication is that there is a role for leadership, symbolism 
and communication; each plays a role in shaping the expectations that drive the selection 
of an equilibrium (Hardin, 1995).  Thus do Prunier (1998) and others (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999) emphasise the power of radio milles collines in provoking ethnic fears in 
Rwanda. 
 
A third approach explores inter-temporal decision making and, in particular, the problem 
of commitment.  Commitment problems arise when preferences can alter overtime; to 
form binding agreements, people must look for ways to demonstrate that their pledges are 
credible. Such problems arise in economic settings, as when people seek to invest; given 
the gains to be made from the opportunistic appropriation of investments, pledges to 
repay maybe doubted, and economic opportunities therefore lost.  Problems of credibility 
also arise in political settings; antagonistic groups may be unwilling to disarm for fear of Page   Ethnicity_Paper  9 
being oppressed, resulting in the continuation of costly but unproductive military 
expenditures. 
 
Because ethnic groups provide opportunities for repeated interaction, they enable the use 
of punishment strategies to render opportunistic defection costly (Platteau, 1994).  
Development economist stress that because ethnic groups are endowed with this form of 
social capital, they can mobilise financial capital for private investment.  Thus Greif’s 
(1993) study of the Maghrebi traders and Fafchamps’s (forthcoming) research into ethnic 
networks in Africa (see also Bates and Yackovlev, 2002).  By contrast, those who focus 
on the politics of ethnic groups tend to stress the paucity, rather than the availability, of 
mechanisms for imparting credibility to pledges of political restraint (Azam, 1994).  
Because of the absence of such mechanisms, some argue, multi-ethnic societies fail to 
produce negotiated cost-sharing agreements; given the variation in preferences (Alesina 
et al., 1999) and the externalities to which public goods give rise (Miguel and Gugerty, 
2002), they therefore undersupply public goods.  Interactions between ethnic groups, still 
others emphasise, can also generate ‘security dilemmas’ in which each group’s search for 
security (as by arming) renders others less secure (Posen, 1993; Fearon, 1996).  In such 
settings, fear becomes rational (Bates et al., 1998; Weingast and de Figueiredo, 1999) and 
insecurity the norm.  Some, such as Posen (1993), therefore relate ethnic diversity to 
conflict.  Laitin and Fearon (1996) demonstrate that peace rather than conflict most often 
prevails in ethnically variegated settings, however.  Bates and Yackovlev (2002) find that 
ethnic diversity becomes politically dangerous when the size of the largest ethnic group Page   Ethnicity_Paper  10
approaches 50 percent of the population.  Collier and Hoeffler (1999b) confirm Bates and 
Yackovlev’s finding, but only for non-democratic states.   
 
Recent research into the role of ethnic groups thus places the subject at the interface 
between rational choice theory and the study of culture.  It treats ethnicity as a strategy, 
but one that taps the power of symbolism, of history, and of interpretation and rhetoric.  
By focusing on ethnicity, those committed to rational choice theory are thus challenged to 
probe not only the economic and political well-springs of human behaviour but also 
forces that, for want of a better term, we designate as cultural.  The viability of this 
program rests on the degree to which rational behaviour is possible in ethnic settings; and 
this possibility in turn rests on the capacity of persons to discern and perceive ethnic 
identities and on their assessment of the capacity of others to do so as well. 
 
Empirical Work 
Research into ethnicity has given rise to several lines of empirical research.  As in the 
work of Posner (2004a) and Ferree (2002), one mobilises survey research and electoral 
data and studies to investigate the impact of ethnic diversity on political accountability 
and democratic behaviour.  As exemplified by Fearon (2003) or Scarritt and Mozaffar 
(1999), a second employs aggregate cross national data and explores the impact of ethnic 
diversity on political conflict.  By collecting time-varying, cross national data, Posner 
(2004b) makes possible the measurement of the impact of political conflict on ethnic 
identity as well, thus allowing for the impact for endogeneity.  Still other scholars seek to 
perform experiments.  Thus Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein’s Page   Ethnicity_Paper  11
(forthcoming??) research in Uganda, which explores the capacity of persons to infer and 
attribute ethnic membership.  By probing the common knowledge condition for rational 
behaviour, they seek to determine whether ethnicity can indeed provide a rational basis 
for trust, cooperation, and collective action, as scholars have claimed.   
 
Ethnicity has proven capable of challenging the boundaries of nations.  So too does its 
study reshape the boundaries of scholarship.  
Robert H. Bates 
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